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Honour and Dignity: Trauma Recovery and International Law in the Issue of the 
Comfort Women of South Korea 
 




Despite the decades of work undertaken by the international legal community to attain full 
and satisfactory reparation for the consequences of Japan’s actions during World War II, the 
emotionally-charged bilateral dispute between Japan and South Korea over the issue of the so-
called ‘comfort women’ continues to this day. This paper is focused on analysis of the discourses 
surrounding the issue through the lens of a psychoanalytic methodological framework. Based upon 
the therapeutic work of one of the world’s leading sexual trauma specialists Judith Herman and 
her text Trauma and Recovery (1992), the paper examines the issues at stake in the comfort women 
issue through the themes inherent to Herman’s three stages of recovery for survivors of violent 
trauma. The research concludes that, while there are limitations in applying psychoanalytic 
methodologies to diplomatic disputes, there is value in pursuing and campaigning for holistic and 
therapeutic approaches to historical trauma in the context of feminist legal activisms.  
 




The on-going issue of the so-called ‘comfort women’2 of South Korea and the continued 
dialogue surrounding the traumatic period in World War II, during which Japan’s military and 
governmental authorities detained up to 200,000 young women and girls in euphemistically-named 
‘comfort stations’, is one of the most complex and longest-running legacies of the Second World 
War. In the decades following Japan’s admonition in the Tokyo Trials, which failed to prosecute 
the horrific crimes against hundreds of thousands of women who had been forced into sexual 
slavery by the Japanese military (Henry, 2013), multiple attempts have been made both by South 
Korea and the international community to achieve satisfactory reparation. While the systems and 
procedures of international law have sought to resolve the diplomatic disputes surrounding the 
comfort women, via legal modes of reparation, and with a particular focus on the women of South 
Korea who make up the majority of the victims and survivors, the long-lasting consequences of 
this violent trauma both for the psyche of the individuals involved and the collective memory of 
the victim-nation have yet to be healed. In this regard, psychological and emotional distress lies at 
                                                 
1 Gudrun Getz recently completed an MA Gender Studies with distinction at SOAS University of London. This 
paper is an extended and revised version of her final project for the Gender, Armed Conflict and International Law 
module under the tutelage of Dr. Gina Heathcote. Gudrun’s research interests include Japanese culture and society, 
collective historical memory, ecofeminism, deep ecology and feminist approaches to religious and spiritual practice.  
2 In Japanese 慰安婦 (ianfu), 위안부 (wianbu) in Korean. An estimated 200,000 women and young girls from 
across Korea, China, the Phillipines, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, East Timor and Indonesia (then Dutch 
East Indes) were forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army and referred to as ‘comfort women’. The 
term itself provokes controversy and use of the words ‘comfort women’ should be assumed hereafter to refer to the 
‘so-called comfort women’.  
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the heart of this case. This paper will therefore explore the issue of the comfort women through a 
methodological framework of feminist psychoanalytic critical theory, specifically the work of 
Judith Herman, and the three stages of recovery she proposes in her ground-breaking text Trauma 
and Recovery (1992). In taking this approach I argue for the benefits of incorporating 
psychoanalytic theory into feminist international legal theory when approaching reparation for 
historical abuse and trauma. I assert that, in doing so, one brings the private sphere (traditionally 
occupied by women) into the public sphere (as conventionally occupied by men; Rosaldo 1974), 
thus mobilising feminist activism by highlighting the emotional and psychological impact that 
sexual violence has on the victim-survivor.  
Throughout this paper I analyse the discourse surrounding the comfort women, and the 
legal frameworks employed by the international community, alongside the actions of Japanese and 
South Korean government bodies and NGOs, all within the context of Herman’s three stages of 
recovery. I argue that full and complete resolution of the issue has not been achieved due to an 
underlying failure to appropriately comply with the requirements of these trauma recovery 
processes. The paper will follow the structure of Herman’s recovery stages: 1) safety, 2) 
remembrance and mourning, and 3) reconnection. In the first instance, Herman demonstrates that 
the foundational stage of trauma recovery is reinstatement of physical, emotional and 
psychological safety for the victim-survivor. Here I argue that the historical failure of the Allied 
Forces to acknowledge the crimes during the Tokyo Trials, the gendered hierarchies that are 
reproduced with the repeated use of the phrase ‘honour and dignity’ in reference to the comfort 
women, and the consistent framing of Japan as eternal aggressor, all serve to deny full recovery of 
safety to the victim-survivors. Following the establishment of safety, Herman details the process 
of remembrance of the trauma and the mourning of what was lost throughout the abuse. In 
exploring these themes, I examine the ongoing tensions over comfort women memorial statues, 
the politics of the Yasukuni War Shrine, and the denial of responsibility and promotion of 
revisionist discourse from the Japanese state as obstacles to remembrance and mourning. Herman’s 
final stage of reconnection refers to reconnection both with a subjective identity of Self and, 
consequently, between Self and community. This process follows the successful completion of the 
first two stages and represents the overall goal of trauma recovery. This section will discuss the 
role of the Asian Women’s Fund, the Wednesday Demonstrations and independent women’s 
tribunals in promoting and aiding a reconnection process, while asking whether these activisms 
depend upon maintaining a wider sense of disconnect between the bilateral communities of Japan 
and South Korea. My closing arguments centre on an assessment of the limitations and 
effectiveness of adopting this approach within the context of international law and diplomatic 
disputes, with the aim of encouraging further dialogue surrounding feminist psychoanalytic 





Trauma robs the victim of a sense of power and control; the guiding principle of 
recovery is to restore power and control to the survivor. The first task of recovery 
is to establish the survivor’s safety. This task takes precedence over all others, for 
no other therapeutic work can possibly succeed if safety has not been adequately 
secured. (Herman 1992, p. 159) 
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The Tokyo Trials and Allied Forces as obstacles to safety 
Following the surrender of Japan and subsequent US occupation in 1945, one could be 
forgiven for assuming that the process of securing safety for Korea’s comfort women, as Herman 
describes above, would naturally emerge as a result of the liberation of Korea from 35 years of 
Japanese colonial rule. On the contrary, this merely marked the beginning of a long and tumultuous 
road toward recovery that continues decades later.  
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereafter the Tokyo Trials) that ran 
from 1946 to 1948 appeared to seek full justice for the violences committed by Japan during the 
war, yet the exclusion of the comfort women issue from these trials represents the first major denial 
of safety restoration for the victims and survivors of the atrocities, with even the existence of 
‘comfort stations’ entirely left out of the proceedings. As Herman notes, “[t]raumatic syndromes 
cannot be properly treated if they are not diagnosed” (1991, p.156), and the omission of the 
experiences of the comfort women from the long list of charges laid out against Japan ultimately 
signifies failure at the first hurdle in its refusal to acknowledge that a trauma had even occurred.  
Furthermore, it has since become clear that this was despite the Allied Forces having 
extensive knowledge of comfort stations (Henry, 2013). Documentation prepared by the US Army 
Psychological Warfare Team provides evidence of the interrogation of twenty Korean comfort 
women captured as prisoners of war, the details of which are presented in the Japanese Prisoner 
of War Interrogation Report No.49 (United States Office of War Information, 1944; hereafter 
Report No.49). Although this report clearly demonstrates awareness of the existence of comfort 
stations, the brevity of the document from a unit that ordinarily produced highly detailed accounts 
of its interrogations has been argued to indicate that there was little interest in the subject on the 
part of the US military (Tanaka, 2002). Examination of Report No.49 reveals deeply gendered and 
racist overtones in the attitudes of the authors in its references to “native girls” and in statements 
such as, “interrogations show the average Korean ‘comfort girl’ to be… uneducated, childish, and 
selfish” and “not pretty either by Japanese or Caucasian standards”. Aside from the derogatory 
tone of the report, which describes the women as “nothing more than prostitutes”, there is no 
commentary on the violations committed against these women under the systematic control of the 
comfort stations. Instead the interrogators appear far more interested in ascertaining whether any 
Japanese soldiers revealed state secrets to the women, and the report has an overall air of dismissal 
and disinterest in the experiences of the women themselves. Quite simply, at no time was there a 
consideration that the comfort stations might represent a serious atrocity or war crime. It is highly 
plausible that this was a result of a pervading attitude at the time that rape was, at best, an 
unfortunate side-effect of war, at worst a good soldier’s ‘reward’ for victory (Gardam, 1997). In 
addition to such casual attitudes toward sexual violence, the strong likelihood that the exclusion 
of the comfort women issue from the Tokyo Trials was an attempt to avoid scrutiny of US soldier’s 
regular use of comfort stations themselves during the occupation (Tanaka, 2002) makes the 
inability of the Allied Forces to restore a sense of safety to the victims of Japan’s system of sexual 
slavery painfully clear. 
In the years since the Tokyo Trials, Japan has repeatedly denied legal responsibility for the 
atrocities committed against the comfort women, arguing that neither customary nor conventional 
international law prohibited such actions at the time they occurred (Ahmed, 2004). Although Japan 
chose to extricate itself from the League of Nations in 1933 in what appears to be a defiant refusal 
to be held to the standards of international law, key treaty signatures provide evidence that Japan 
was well aware of international law in regard to enslavement and sexual exploitation. Articles 1 
and 2 of the 1910 Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic state that the 
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recruitment of women or underage girls for “immoral purposes” and “in order to gratify the 
passions of another person” will lead to punishment, and Japan’s 1925 ratification of the 1921 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children saw them 
agreeing to the formal criminalisation of these activities. That the Allied Forces failed to enforce 
prosecution at the Tokyo Trials on the basis of this ratification further destabilises the process of 
safety recovery for the victim-survivors, since this exclusion undermines international law’s 
capacity to create an atmosphere of trust and, consequently, a safe environment for survivors. 
Herman notes: “Survivors feel unsafe in their bodies…Establishing safety begins by focusing on 
control of the body and gradually moves outward toward control of the environment” (1992, 
p.160). Given that the bodies of comfort women continued to be violated by Allied troops even 
after the surrender of Japan, and that, when issues pertaining to the war moved outward to the 
wider environment of international law, their bodies, voices and experiences were actively 
excluded from proceedings that might have provided protection, I assert that the entire foundation 
of trauma recovery was undermined from the very beginning.  
 
Honour and dignity: denial of safety through gendered hierarchies  
Following the supposedly conclusive judgements of the Tokyo Trials, the stories of the 
comfort women remained largely unheard until the late 1980s, when they began to surface in South 
Korea. Ongoing conflict in the Korean War, continued political struggle surrounding the 
democratisation that followed, and the global uncertainty of the Cold War all compounded the 
Korean comfort women’s silence and inability to come forward to tell their harrowing stories. 
With democratisation, however, came the rapid growth of women’s rights movements in Korea 
and by the early 1990s survivors began to disclose their experiences of life in the comfort stations 
(Myoung-sook, 2008). In response to mounting pressure from a number of women’s rights 
organisations to address the issue, Japan found itself forced to launch an investigation into the case 
of the comfort women and released their findings via the 1993 Kōno Statement. In a carefully 
worded statement, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yōhei Kōno expressed Japan’s remorse over the injury 
done to the “honour and dignity” of the comfort women, a phrase that would come up time and 
again in future discourses.3 I argue here that the repeated use of this phrase throughout diplomatic 
discourse serves to further undermine the establishment of safety for the victim-survivors by 
reproducing the intensely gendered systems of hierarchy that enable sexual violence against 
women to begin with.   
The concept of dignity within the context of international law is at once both frustratingly 
vague and specific in its normativity. A product of post-World War II efforts to create a universal 
standard by which to measure the presence of human rights, the lack of a clear definition as to 
what constitutes ‘dignity’ renders the term one of assumed “common sense” (Kamir, 2006, p.193). 
What is clear from the opening lines of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is that dignity 
is an inherent quality that humans possess by default rather than by right of social status (ibid.). 
This being the case, use of the word would imply that the inherent dignity of the comfort women 
was removed by the actions of Japan and must therefore be ‘restored’ by that nation, as urged by 
Special Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
1996). I propose that the repeated demand from the international community for Japan to ‘give 
back’ a dignity that it steadfastly ‘withholds’ serves to maintain the power dynamics inherent to 
Japan’s role as aggressor-abuser who ‘enslaves’ South Korea as victim-survivor. By providing 
                                                 
3 See for example United Nations Committee Against Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (2013) and Shadow Report to CEDAW (2009) 
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Japan with the opportunity to deny an ‘inherent’ attribute to the victim-survivors, Japan retains its 
power as a historical abuser and inhibits the reinstatement of safety by reproducing the original 
ordeal of having this dignity ‘removed’.  
The gendered implications of the use of the word ‘honour’ further destabilise the first stage 
of trauma recovery. As Kamir notes, while “[a]ll persons are worthy of human dignity and/or 
possess it merely by being human… [h]onour entails variable status and virtue” (2006, p.202) and, 
when those persons happen to be female, the presence or lack of either honour or its polar opposite, 
shame, is intrinsically linked to her sexual activity. Furthermore, “[a]n honour society entails a 
structured hierarchy and strict social roles, encouraging assertive competition among men and 
sexual constraint among women” (ibid. p.196). Thus repeated references to the need for 
reclamation of honour for the comfort women is not only a request for the removal of the ‘shame’ 
associated with their bodies, it is a demand for the stripping of ‘honour’ from the patriarchal nation 
of Japan.  
Japan remains a disarmed nation since the war, with Article 9 of its 1946 constitution 
declaring renouncement of war as a sovereign right and pledging eternal disarmament. 4 
Interestingly, this introduction to the constitution expresses the desire that the people of Japan 
“…occupy an honoured place in an international society…” (Constitution of Japan 1946; my 
emphasis), suggesting that, along with an underlying principle of pacifism, recovery from shame 
was among Japan’s top priorities after the war. Perhaps the discursive restoration of honour to the 
comfort women and South Korea as a collective community represents a figurative emasculation 
of Japan as a nation, since the (re)construction of collective shame for Japan would be an inevitable 
consequence of that honour restoration. In addition, by maintaining its own national ‘honour’, 
Japan again perpetuates its historic role as aggressor-abuser since, “[a]s long as the abuser has not 
relinquished his wish for dominance, the threat of violence is still present” (Herman, 1992, p. 168).  
 
 
Remembrance and Mourning  
 
In the second stage of recovery, the survivor tells the story of the trauma. She tells 
it completely, in depth and in detail. This work of reconstruction…transforms the 
traumatic memory, so that it can be integrated into the survivor’s life story 
(Herman, 1992, p.197) 
 
Memorial statues as interruptions of remembrance  
In December 2015, Japan and South Korea issued a joint statement stating that they had 
“finally and irreversibly” resolved the issue of the comfort women (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, 2015). In return for a one-off contribution of ¥1 billion from the Government of Japan, 
South Korea agreed to refrain from criticising Japan over the issue in international forums and 
promised to address Japan’s concerns over a comfort woman memorial statue outside the Japanese 
embassy in Seoul. This commitment was understood to amount to removal of the statue, which 
Japan claimed to represent an “impairment of its dignity” (ibid.). At the end of 2016, the activists 
                                                 
4 This was true at the time of writing. However the recently re-elected Prime Minister Shinzō Abe is expected to 
attempt to remove Article 9 from the constitution so that Japan might once against possess a standing army. If 
successful, it will be interesting to see how the trauma recovery process will be impacted given that South Korea’s 
relationship with Japan is perpetually infused with historical memory of the atrocities that led to the latter’s initial 
disarmament.  
 68 
Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol. 19, No. 1  January 2018 
  
behind the Seoul statue removed it from the embassy, only to re-erect it outside the Japanese 
consulate in Busan, a move that led to Japan recalling envoys to South Korea in protest. I argue 
here that the diplomatic disagreements over comfort women statues, which continue at the time of 
writing (Minegishi, 2017), interrupt the recovery process of remembrance and mourning and deny 
the victim-survivors an opportunity to integrate the past into their life story.  
Blustein notes that, “[m]odes of remembrance, officially and publicly implemented and 
supported, are instances of a type of historical redress or reparation for the harms caused by the 
wrongs of the past” (2015, p. 75), but the erection of the comfort woman statue outside the 
Japanese embassy in Seoul in 2011 by a private civil activist group, The Korean Council for the 
Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (hereafter The Korean Council), initially 
represented the failure of Japan to make full legal reparation. Early in their campaign, The Korean 
Council listed among its seven demands from the Japanese government the construction of 
memorial tablets for the victims of military sexual slavery (Korean Council for the Women Drafted 
for the Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, 1994), highlighting the significance of remembrance in 
facilitating the healing of violent historical trauma. Two years later, a report from the Special 
Rapporteur into the issue stressed the importance of UN member states fulfilling their obligations 
to make reparation for past wrongdoings, with part of that process consisting of commemorations 
for victims (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1996), thus asserting the value of public 
remembrance within legal modes of reparation.  
However, the dispute over these statues, which resurfaces whenever a new memorial is 
erected or moved, represents a major interruption to the process of telling the comfort woman story 
in such a way that it might be integrated fully into the life story of South Korea as victim-survivor 
nation. This disturbance becomes another signifier of the abuser-victim relationship between Japan 
and South Korea, with the two nation’s historical power dynamic manifesting in a political struggle 
over who remembers what and, crucially, how and where it is remembered.  
Herman (1992) notes that the simple act of remembering and telling a story of trauma 
actively promotes healing and transformation of post-traumatic stress for the victim-survivor, but 
that this transformation can only occur if the story is told within a safe space to someone who is 
listening. While South Korea insists upon the story of the comfort women being remembered in 
very public spaces, such as with the recent installation of statues on Seoul buses (McCurry, 2017), 
Japan is challenged to allow the victim-survivor to tell their story in their own space, in their own 
words. Japan’s continued belligerence over the comfort women memorial statues undermines not 
only the remembrance element of the second stage of trauma recovery, it denies opportunities for 
public mourning for the lost lives of those women who died in captivity, for those who survived 
their enslavement yet died without witnessing satisfactory reparation, and for those survivors who 
still seek full acknowledgement and remembrance of their experiences. Since the second stage of 
trauma recovery requires that “[t]he basic principle of empowerment continues to apply” and 
asserts that “[t]he choice to confront the horrors of the past rests with the survivor” (Herman, 1992, 
p.175), the unstable position of the comfort women memorial statues as sites of remembrance deny 
victim-survivors empowerment and control, and further intervene in the trauma recovery process.  
 
Collective amnesia: denial, revisionism and sites of recurring trauma 
In turning attention to sites of remembrance and mourning as a necessary stage of healing 
the traumas of the past, it is helpful to consider the tensions surrounding discursive constructions 
of historical memory. Cubitt (2007, p.27) proposes two underlying vocabularies that form an 
understanding of the process of historical memory assemblage: 1) that the memory experienced in 
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the present is the result of a linear process of causality, in which the events of the past lead to the 
creation of a memory of those events in the present, and 2) that the events of the past are (re)created 
through the formation of memories in the imagination of the present and where “it is not the past 
that produces the present, but…the present that produces the past”. Considering the manner in 
which these two oppositional constructions of memory might coalesce, he argues that: “…our 
retrospective constructions of the past are themselves historically conditioned – shaped…by the 
very flow of past events and experiences at which their selective and creative backward gaze is 
directed” (p.28). This notion of cyclical memory construction, in which the past leads to a memory 
that in turns informs the recreation of the past, is of particular interest when examining the role of 
Yasukuni Shrine in the remembrance and mourning stage of trauma recovery.  
Built in the Meiji Era as a war memorial site in which to house the ‘divine spirits’ (神, 
kami) of those lost to armed conflict, Yasukuni Shrine became a highly controversial location of 
political and historical memory construction in the 1970s when a number of convicted war 
criminals were enshrined there; including WWII Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō, who was executed 
following his conviction at the Tokyo Trials. Although Yasukuni Shrine also houses the remains 
of more than 2,466,000 other individuals who have died in wars since 1853 (Yasukuni Shrine 
2008a), including women and young girls who were “involved in relief operation in battlefields” 
(Yasukuni Shrine 2008b), any sanctification of the spirits of the comfort women as kami remains 
absent from both the memorial site itself and the war museum adjacent to the shrine. Breen 
observes that “[t]he shrine venerates as glorious spirits only the military” (2008, p. 143), with the 
wartime experiences of civilians omitted from the shrine’s remembrance processes and rituals. The 
shrine therefore becomes a site of selective memory, serving as the location of a (re)constructed 
history where the past is (re)imagined through a particular lens of anamnesis of some memories 
and amnesia of others. Since the narrative function of Yasukuni is to preserve a recollection of the 
‘glorious dead’ as holding an honourable place in Japanese history and therefore the nation’s sense 
of cultural identity, the telling of this history is by necessity subject to a process of selectivity. For 
Korea as victim-nation, such amnesia stands as a barrier for the remembrance and mourning stage 
of trauma recovery since, “[a] narrative that does not include the traumatic imagery and bodily 
sensations is barren and incomplete” (Herman, 1992, p. 177).  
Yasukuni Shrine also reignites and reconstructs the memory of past trauma every few years 
when controversial visits are made by Japanese officials and international dignitaries. One of the 
most significant figures to visit the site in recent years was the current prime minister of Japan 
Shinzō Abe in 2013, although more recently he has maintained a distance and chosen instead to 
send ritual offerings at traditional times of year. For Korea, whose national recollection of Japan’s 
actions in the war calls to mind anything but a sense of divinity worthy of veneration, the regular 
legitimisation of the site as a location of historical memory becomes an aggressive challenge to 
their own sense of national identity as performed through their collective memory of the past. In 
2016, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement expressing their “deep concern 
and disappointment” over Japan’s cabinet ministers paying tribute by sending offerings to the 
shrine and urged them to act in accordance with “a correct view of history” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Korea, 2016), affirming that continued collective amnesia on the part of 
Japan remains central to ongoing tensions surrounding the site. In this regard, the site represents 
another enduring struggle over the construction of memory, with the trauma survivor urging the 
perpetrator to remember the past, while the perpetrator constructs an alternative version of history 
through their commitment to symbolic amnesia. With this underlying disconnect between the two 
nations infusing and informing bilateral relations over issues such as North Korea’s nuclear 
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weapons programme, the issue demonstrates the immense power of the phenomena described by 
Cubitt (2007) above when both linear and retrospective reconstructions of the past are 
simultaneously employed.  
Shinzō Abe’s visit to the shrine came just six months after Lower House lawmaker Nariaki 
Nakayama and the mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, both caused outrage by publicly denying 
that any women were forced into sexual slavery during the war and that the comfort women were 
willingly recruited (Hofilena, 2013; BBC Asia, 2013). Such denials and revisionist discourses were 
gradually becoming more frequent, with The Korean Council submitting a report to the Committee 
Against Torture (CAT) noting several instances of denial and defamation, including revisionist 
narratives appearing in Japanese school textbooks (Korean Council for the Women Drafted for the 
Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, 2013). In response, CAT produced its own report urging Japan 
to publicly refute denials by government officials, acknowledge its legal responsibility for the 
crimes, and to educate the public on the comfort women’s experiences (United Nations Committee 
Against Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2013). These 
reports immediately followed a UN missive which likewise urged Japan to accept legal 
responsibility for human rights abuses, compensate the surviving victims individually, and ensure 
historically accurate education in schools and public arenas (United Nations Human Rights 
Council, 2013). Japan refused to accept these demands, stating that financial compensation had 
been made in the form of the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF), and that students in schools were 
sufficiently enabled to “consider historical events from various perspectives and judge them fairly 
rather than to apprehend them from a one-sided perspective” (ibid, 147.158). Such discourses call 
to mind Herman’s observations of perpetrators of violence: “In order to escape accountability for 





Helplessness and isolation are the core experiences of psychological trauma. 
Empowerment and reconnection are the core experiences of recovery. In the third stage of 
recovery, the traumatised person recognizes that she has been a victim and understands the 
effects of her victimisation. Now she is ready… to take concrete steps to increase her sense 
of power and control, to protect herself against future danger, and to deepen her alliances 
with those whom she has learned to trust (Herman, 1992, p. 197). 
 
The Asian Women’s Fund and the Wednesday Demonstrations 
Following the 1993 Kono Statement, plans were made to establish a fund to provide 
compensation for the surviving comfort women via programmes aimed at restoring their ‘honour 
and dignity’. This led to the establishment of the Asian Women’s Fund in 1995 despite widespread 
concern from activist groups, including The Korean Council, that creating a third-party fund 
instead of directly compensating the victim-survivors was an attempt to circumnavigate the 
sticking point of Japan’s admission of legal responsibility (Myoung-sook, 2008). As such, the 
majority of the surviving comfort women refused to accept money from the fund (Kimura, 2015). 
Following the dissolution of the AWF in 2007 in light of the “completion of its Atonement Project” 
(Tomiichi Murayama, 2005), the Japanese government has repeatedly referred to the organisation 
as evidence of it having fulfilled its moral obligations toward the comfort women.5 Whilst the 
                                                 
5 See for example United Nations Human Rights Council, 2013. 
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establishment of the AWF was, superficially at least, an attempt to initiate a process of 
reconnection between the comfort women and their wider communities through social welfare 
projects (ibid.), the disconnect between the Japanese government and the victim-survivors that was 
produced by creating a third-party fund (financed by a combination of donations from the Japanese 
public and government-funded welfare trusts and not by the government directly), served to 
destabilise the reconnection process.  
The dissatisfaction of activist groups regarding the mechanisms of the AWF run in parallel 
to ongoing feminist-led transnational political activisms that have had a significant impact on the 
handling of the comfort women issue by international agents and actors, including the UN (Piper, 
2001). These activisms, organised in Korea, and supported by the international community, can 
most manifestly be seen in the long-running Wednesday Demonstrations, a protest in response to 
Japan’s conduct that has taken place at the Japanese embassy in Seoul every Wednesday since 
1991. As well as acting as a protest performance in the most characteristic sense, these 
demonstrations have become a site of connection between individual survivors as a community 
among themselves, and as a source of reconnection with the larger community. Activists who 
support the comfort women regularly attend not just to protest but simply to spend time with the 
elderly survivors of the war, to hear their stories, tell their own, and provide a sense of belonging 
in the wider community that was absent for the survivors in the years that they remained silent 
(ibid, p. 163). A question arises, however, in regards to what might become of this site of 
reconnection should the goal of full reparation from the Japanese government be achieved: would 
the connection and community created at the Wednesday Demonstrations be lost if its purpose was 
removed? In this sense, there is a tension here that lies at the heart of all protests: since the 
solidarity created at a protest site can only exist while the source of the protest remains, can a 
protest ever really lead to the full experience of reconnection as part of trauma recovery, since the 
achievement of the protest’s aims would dissolve this reconnection? That said, these 
demonstrations fulfil one of the vital stages in trauma recovery and the reconnection with self, 
namely that of the survivor mission. As Herman notes, “[s]ocial action offers the survivor a source 
of power that draws upon her own initiative, energy, and resourcefulness but that magnifies these 
qualities far beyond her own capacities” (1992, p.207). By publicly situating themselves within a 
group that shares a historical memory of systematic violence, the comfort women and their 
supporters reclaim the agency previously stripped from them and recover a source of power that 
enables social and legal reform, with wide-reaching consequences that stretch beyond the site-
specific context of their protest.  
 
Women’s tribunals as sites of reconnection  
In December 2000, a number of NGOs came together in Tokyo following two years of 
intense preparation to host The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military 
Sexual Slavery (WIWCT). The tribunal sought to achieve what the Tokyo Trials did not, namely 
to pass judgement on the actions of the Japanese military and government over the atrocities 
committed against the comfort women. That phrase itself was rejected and replaced with the words 
‘survivor’, ‘victim’ and ‘sexual slaves’, all firmly locating the tribunal within the context of 
feminist legal activism (Sakamoto, 2001). Adhering to the modes of performance inherent to 
international legal frameworks, WIWCT engaged the use of judges, witnesses, prosecutors and 
analyses of testimony. Although not directly affiliated to the UN, a number of former UN actors 
participated in the tribunal including former Special Rapporteur Gay McDougall and Gabrielle 
Kirk McDonald, who had acted as president of the International War Crimes Tribunal on the 
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Former Yugoslavia, thus lending weight to WIWCT’s intended status as a judgement from the 
international community. Outcomes of the proceedings included the ruling that Japan had violated 
international customary law, human rights laws and international humanitarian law in their 
enslavement of the victim-survivors, explicitly refuting Japan’s claims that the comfort women 
system was legal during the time in which it took place (ibid., pp. 55-56). In a particularly damning 
move, the court also found then-Emperor Hirohito guilty of sexual slavery and rape, as crimes 
against humanity on the basis of state responsibility, and recommended declassification of military 
and governmental documentation pertaining to the failure to prosecute him at the Tokyo Trials 
(Women’s Caucus For Gender Justice, 2001).  
These proceedings were not just an attempt to construct legal justice within the framework 
of international law models, they provided a transnational forum in which the voices of the 
surviving victims could finally be heard, and in which the visceral emotions of grief, rage, anger, 
despair and catharsis, so far removed from the clinical rationality of legal discourse, could be 
witnessed and experienced by the thousand-plus members of the audience who participated in the 
process. Sixty-four women from eight countries came to take part in the proceedings, representing 
the largest gathering of former comfort women that had occurred since the atrocities. Twenty of 
these women told the truth of their harrowing experiences for the world to hear, with the court 
affirming the symbolic importance of this act in helping to facilitate healing and recovery where 
the Tokyo Trials did not (ibid.). For those present as witnesses and those participating in sharing 
their testimony, it was a moving experience unlike any other (Sakamoto, 2001). Twelve years later, 
the Asia-Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing on Gender-Based Violence in Conflict conducted a 
similar testimonial-based event elevating the stories of women from Cambodia, Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Timor-Leste, which resulted in a number of recommendations for those respective countries 
and the UN in which to further seek modes of protection and prevention of gender-based sexual 
violence.  
Although these hearings have no formal legal standing, nor possess the power to enforce 
legal change, the solidarity and community created through such actions provide an essential site 
of connection and reconnection for victim-survivors. The networks they create between feminist 
legal activists, and the opportunities for catharsis they provide to survivors through their testimony, 
demonstrate the powerful capacity international legal frameworks have for supporting modes of 
trauma recovery. It is, of course, a continued source of sadness that tribunals such as these remain 
purely symbolic, with no palpable legal consequences faced by the perpetrator/s of the crime and 
no guarantee of definitive justice. In discussing the pursuit of legal justice as part of the survivor 
mission, Judith Herman writes:  
 
The survivor who elects to engage in public battle cannot afford to delude herself 
about the inevitability of victory. She must be secure in the knowledge that simply 
in her willingness to confront her perpetrator she has overcome one of the most 
terrible consequences of the trauma. She has let him know he cannot rule her by 
fear, and she has exposed his crime to others. Her recovery is based not on the 
illusion that evil has been overcome, but rather on the knowledge that it has not 
entirely prevailed and on the hope that restorative love may still be found in the 
world (1992, p. 211).  
 
With this in mind, I assert the resoundingly powerful potential for women’s tribunals to succeed 
where international law aspires but often fails, namely in the restoration of moral justice and 
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In adopting a methodological framework of feminist psychoanalytic theory within the 
context of the gendered implications of international legal discourse surrounding the issue of the 
comfort women, I have suggested that such an approach possesses inherent value when seeking a 
solution to issues arising from institutionalised sexual violence against women in armed conflict. 
By framing this ongoing historical dispute within the structure of the trauma recovery process as 
outlined by Judith Herman, I have demonstrated the manner in which international law seeks 
justice via methods of protection, prevention and reparation, all of which align with this process. 
However, it is my conclusion that, despite its best efforts, the framework of international law fails 
to achieve the desired outcome of a final resolution to this particular matter. I argue that this failure 
is a result of the lack of conscious integration between methodologies that are necessary for a full 
and complete trauma recovery process, and the modes of reparation as performed by the 
international community and the governments of both Japan and South Korea. While I have 
demonstrated Japan’s consistent failure to accept legal responsibility and accountability, assimilate 
its violent history into the nation’s life-story, provide stable sites of remembrance and perform 
humble and reverent reparation for its past crimes, it must also be acknowledged that South Korea 
and the international community have unintentionally contributed interruptions to the trauma 
recovery process. The exclusion of the comfort women from the Tokyo Trials, the tardiness with 
which international law has recognised war as impacting women differently from men,6 the focus 
on ‘honour and dignity’, with all the gendered implications that phrase possesses, and the lack of 
inclusion of The Korean Council in the decision making processes of establishing bilateral 
agreements, have all served to disrupt the process of securing a long-lasting, holistic treatment and 
a healing of the horrors endured by the individual comfort women themselves, and for Korea as a 
historically traumatised nation.  
The limitations of adopting this approach should not be ignored, of course, and I concede 
that significant issues arise in proposing that a methodology developed for the treatment of 
individual human beings might represent a solution to the diplomatic complications facing bilateral 
and international communities. Individuals are not nations. Kim Hak-sun, the first comfort woman 
to bravely come forward and tell her story (Kimura, 2015), is not the nation of South Korea and 
such an implication would undoubtedly be problematic given the gendered power dynamics that 
underlie the concept of Woman as symbolic of the nation. There is a danger here of reproducing 
violences performed through discourses surrounding ‘The Motherland’ in the context of armed 
conflict, a concept which begets a series of harmful ideologies, and frames women’s sexual 
function as rendering them “bearers of the nation” (McClintock 1993, 61-62). However, if nations 
are ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 2006) made up of individuals, I argue that it stands to 
reason that trauma recovery processes successfully employed in the healing of individuals can be 
effectively engaged in the healing of nations seeking restorative treatment for historical suffering, 
if implemented by international legal frameworks which already strive to produce humanitarian 
justice through reparative means. While willingly acquiescing that there are neither easy answers 
nor quick fixes to this deeply complex, sensitive and long-running dispute, I propose that the 
                                                 
6 The first international occurrence of this recognition was in 2000 through United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1325.  
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conscious integration of sympathetic and therapeutic modes of trauma recovery into the strategies 
employed by nations and the international community in seeking diplomatic and legal solutions to 
historical violences, is a mode of enquiry worthy of further exploration and serious contemplation.  
One vital component of Herman’s framework (1992) of trauma recovery that is absent 
throughout the attempted resolution of this conflict, and which serves as an appropriate conclusion 
to my exploration of the topic, is the importance of acknowledging that the process of recovery 
from trauma is never final nor complete. While international law seeks concrete resolution and 
conclusion via linear modes of justice, Herman’s three stages of recovery intertwine and coalesce 
with each other. They render themselves worthy of revisiting in light of new traumas or the 
triggering of old wounds, while the story of the original trauma is destined never to leave the 
victim-survivor, instead requiring integration into their life-story. What is possible, however, is a 
new future with the potential for love, joy, and a long-awaited freedom from suffering. As one 
survivor of incest and child abuse proclaimed at the end of her therapy, “I have burst into an infinite 
world full of wonder” (Herman, 1992 p. 213). Such is my hope for all comfort women, living and 
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